Adverse selection in the U.S. health insurance markets: Evidence from the MEPS by Di Novi, Cinzia
 
Dipartimento di Politiche Pubbliche e Scelte Collettive – POLIS 



















Adverse selection in the U.S.  
health insurance markets:  
Evidence from the MEPS 
 



















UNIVERSITA’ DEL PIEMONTE ORIENTALE “Amedeo Avogadro”  ALESSANDRIA 
 
Periodico mensile on-line "POLIS Working Papers" - Iscrizione n.591 del 12/05/2006 - Tribunale di Alessandria 
 Adverse Selection in the U.S. Health Insurance Markets: Evidence from
the MEPS1
Cinzia Di Novi2
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uals who are more exposed to health risks also buy insurance contracts with more
coverage or higher expected payments. The critical statistical problem is that the
extension of insurance is only measured for those who are insured and face positive
health care expenditure. So there is a possible sample selection bias eﬀect. The
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the seminal papers by Akerlof (1970) and by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
greater attention has been devoted to the problem of asymmetric information among
agents. An important form of asymmetric information between consumers and in-
surers is adverse selection. In health insurance market adverse selection may occur
when consumers’ true health-cost risk is private information: insurance companies
may know that consumers vary in the level of risk, but, in principle, are not able
to discern who are high and who are low risk proﬁle individuals within a group of
potential insured. Identifying risks accurately is not an easy task and requires that
insurance companies incur some costs. Insured parties are heterogeneous in terms
of expected costs and have more information about their risks. Naturally, high-risk
individuals are not encouraged to “reveal” their risk; this asymmetry is a serious
problem since may lead insurance companies to face large diﬀerences in expected
health costs due to heterogeneity in demographics and the incidence of illness.
As the insurers has imperfect information on the individuals’ health status, the
cover and the premium will be set somewhere between what is required by the low
and the high risk proﬁle users. However, low risk users may feel they are paying too
much with respect to their needs. Low risk individuals tend to drop out of the risk
pool, then, the average risk in the pool rises causing premium to rise and yet more
people to drop out and so on. This may leave to the case in which only high risk
proﬁle individuals buy insurance and pay “average” rate.
To counteract to this problem, insurance companies may oﬀer separate contracts
with diﬀerent coverage and prices, making claimant pay part of the claim (with
coinsurance rate, deductible etc.) so that individuals should reveal their risks. Hence,
risky individuals who expect high health care costs would tend to purchase insurance
with higher premium but lower excesses since they are more likely to be claiming
2on a regular basis. On the other hand lower risk users, who expect low costs, would
prefer a less complete insurance, with a lower premium and a higher excess in the
unlikely event that they have to claim.3 The phenomenon described above is known
as ex ante adverse selection” (Fang et.al, 2006)4.
The “positive correlation property” between the individual riskiness and the com-
pleteness of a health insurance plan, which characterize this phenomenon, forms the
basis for our empirical test for adverse selection. This test is conducted by using
data from the 2003/2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey — Household Compo-
nent (MEPS-HC) in conjunction with the previous year’s National Health Interview
Survey (NHIS). Many empirical work use information on coinsurance rate, health
insurance beneﬁts, stop-loss and deductible to measure generosity of health insur-
ance plan (see, for instance, Browne and Doerpinghaus, 1993). Unfortunately our
data do not contain information about the insurance contract ; hence, we measure
health insurance plan completeness by using health insurance reimbursement that
is the diﬀerence between total health expenditure and out-of-pocket expenditure on
health care paid by consumers.
Health insurance reimbursement, however, is only deﬁned for a subset of
individuals from the overall population since we observe it only for those who par-
ticipate in insurance and have positive health care expenditure. Thus, the model
may suﬀer from sample selection bias and straightforward regression analysis may
lead to inconsistent parameters estimate. Another problem that arises from the es-
timation is the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the equations of interest.
3This form of allocation has been proved superior (in terms of economic eﬃciency) to that in
which a mean price is paid by all individuals. The main work in this area is attributed to Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976).
4This is also known as adverse selection eﬀect ` a la Rothschild-Stiglitz: high risk agents, know-
ing they are more likely to have an accident, self-select by choosing contracts entailing a more
comprehensive coverage.
3Wooldridge (1995) has proposed an estimator which deals with both sources of es-
timation bias. We extend this estimation method to the case in which selectivity is
due to two sources rather than one (participation in insurance and participation in
health care expenditure). The nature of the test is similar to the one in Browne and
Doerpinghaus (1993).
We ﬁnd no systematic relation between illness of individuals and insurance choice.
We think that a possible explanation can be found in the so called ”cream skimming”
practise: health plans may have an incentive to alter their policy to attract the
healthy and repeal the sick (Newhouse, 1996; Ellis, 1997). Then, individuals enrolled
are relatively healthy people and this lead to the failure of the correlation test.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂys u r v e y s
the empirical related literature. Section 3 describes the data and variables. In
Section 4 we perform the empirical analysis, explain the test in detail and present
our main results. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion. The deﬁnition
of the variables, descriptive statistics and tables with estimation coeﬃcients are in
Appendix .
42 Related Literature
There is substantial empirical literature examining adverse selection in health in-
surance markets. However, there is conﬂicting evidence on the presence of adverse
selection: the results are mixed. We brieﬂy summarize these studies here.
Cameron and Trivedi (1991), for instance, use Australian data to estimate a
logit model for the choice between a standard package and a more generous insur-
ance plan. They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of health condition variables on insurance
choice. Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993) ﬁnd evidence for adverse selection: their
results show that low and high risks purchase a pooling insurance policy and low
risks subsidize the insurance purchase of high risk insured individuals. This supports
the prediction by Miyazaki’s (1977) theory of adverse selection. Cardon and Hendel
(2001) test for a correlation between health care spending and insurance coverage
using a two-stage model of the demand for health insurance. In their setup, individ-
uals ﬁrst receive a private signal that is correlated with their future health. Based on
this signal individuals make their choice about how much insurance to purchase. In
the second stage, individuals consume health care. Their empirical analyses revealed
that the joint insurance/health care consumption decision is largely explained by
observed characteristics (such as income, education etc.) rather than unobserved
health status. Thus, they conclude that apparently there is no private information
that insureds can use against the insurers and hence no adverse selection.
Bajari et al. (2006) use the Health Retirement Study to estimate a structural
model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. They ﬁnd evidence
of moral hazard but not of adverse selection. Goldman et al. (2006) estimate in-
dependent eﬀects of medical and drug beneﬁts on plan selection. They ﬁnd that
while generosity of the medical beneﬁt played an important role in choosing a plan,
choices did not vary signiﬁcantly by health status. In contrast, their data support a
5signiﬁcant correlation between health status and plans with generous drug beneﬁts:
sicker individuals tend to enroll in plans with generous drug beneﬁts, while healthier
choose less generous plan. Based on their ﬁndings, they assert that drug coverage
may be more susceptible to adverse selection than medical coverage .
In insurance markets other than health, evidence for adverse selection is consid-
erably contradictory too. Puelz and Snow (1994) presented empirical evidence of
adverse selection in the market for automobile collision insurance. Using data from
a private insurer, they ﬁnd strong evidence of adverse selection in the insurer’s port-
folio. Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000) use data on contracts and accidents to examine
the extent of asymmetric information in the French market for automobile insur-
ance. They examine a relatively homogenous group of drivers with less than four
years’ driving experience. Their test do not reveal evidence of risk-related adverse
selection. They ﬁnd that when choosing their automobile insurance contracts, indi-
viduals behave as though they had no better knowledge of their risk than insurance
companies, which is in contrast with what the adverse selection hypothesis would
require.
Cawley and Philipson (1999) test for adverse selection in the market for life in-
surance; they ﬁrst show that the death rate among those who purchase life insurance
is lower than those who do not, moreover they ﬁnd that who expect to die soon do
not buy more complete life insurance plan. This is clearly in contrast with the basic
adverse selection theory.
Finally, Makki and Somwaru (2001) analyze farmers’ choices of crop insurance
contracts. Their analysis oﬀers empirical evidence of adverse selection by showing
that high-risk farmers are more likely to select revenue insurance contracts and higher
coverage levels with respect to low—risk farmers.
Most of the studies we have come across have used discrete choice models to
6represent the health insurance purchase decision. They have used logit or probit
speciﬁcations to analyze a decision where the dependent variable has two outcomes:
buying or not buying health insurance. Few studies have gone to the next level
and tried to explain which factors aﬀect the extent of insurance purchase. More-
over, in most of the studies that test for adverse selection two important estimation
issues such as unobserved heterogeneity and selection bias, are typically treated sep-
arately5. The aim of this paper is to ﬁnd factors which aﬀect the extent of insurance
purchase with particular attention to individuals’ risk proﬁle. In our model, we con-
trol for selection bias and at the same time for unobserved heterogeneity issue. The
simultaneous account taken of both possible sources of bias seems to be relatively
new for this kind of application.
5It is often mathematically complex to combine these two issues together, a large burden of
computer programming and a set of strong distributional assumptions are needed for the com-
bination. The model presented in this paper, however, is estimated with the common statistical
software STATA 9. Also the statistical assumptions needed for Wooldridge’s model in this paper
is relatively weaker than the other methods.
73D a t a a n d V a r i a b l e s
We use data from the 2003/2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey — Household
Component (MEPS-HC) and 2002 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). MEPS
is an on-going survey sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ). MEPS provides a nationally representative sample of US civilian non-
institutionalized population. MEPS is self-reported and contains detailed informa-
tion on health care consumption and demographics including age, sex, marital status,
income, work status and geographic location. In addition data contain information
on the respondents’ health status, health conditions, health charges and payments,
access to care, health conditions, health insurance coverage.
Each year’s sample for MEPS is drawn from respondents to the previous year’s
NHIS that is conducted annually by the National Centers for Health Statistics
(NCHS), Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). NHIS provides rather
detailed information about health status, diseases, life-style, education and other
individual characteristics. We use the 2002 NHIS in conjunction with 2003/2004
MEPS with MEPS as our primary database because it contains information on health
insurance reimbursement, which is the dependent variable of interest in this paper,
as well as detailed information on health insurance.
After correcting for the missing values, the sample contains 890 individuals
resulting in 1780 observations. Observations containing veterans and individuals
who are covered by Champus/ ChampVa insurance are removed from the data set
since their medical services demand and access to medical services diﬀer distinctly
from the general population6.
6The health care system in US is characterized by: private insurance, Medicare and Medicaid
and Military health insurance.
Private medical insurance is the largest component of the health care system: insured pay a fee-
for-service reimbursement basis; they pay directly the medical treatments and be reimbursed at a
later date by the insurer. Medicare is a program funded by the government through social security
8Table 2 presents summary statistics for demographics and health insurance infor-
mation. The sample of 1780 individuals is divided into insured and uninsured. Only
8% of the sample is uninsured. As showed in Table 2, uninsured are younger, and
poorer. Health care expenditure is important relative to total income, around 11%
for insured and 13% for uninsured. The average expenditure in the whole sample is
4,300 $. The distribution of the expenditures is highly skewed, as expected. Insured
spent 50% more in health care than uninsured (4314$ versus 2001 $).
Table 2 shows that 89% of insured report that their health is good versus the
82% of uninsured. Insured behave in a healthier way: the percentage of smoker and
the percentage of heavy alcohol consumers are lower; on average they present a lower
BMI, and they practice physical activity more often than uninsured.
At ﬁrst sight, it seems that there are no symptoms consistent with adverse selec-
tion: a substantial fraction of the sample is insured and among insured about 90%
of individuals enjoy good health7.
payments. It was created mainly for people 65 years of age and older, some disabled people under
65 years of age, and people with end-stage renal disease. This scheme is extremely basic with very
few services oﬀered with much of the cost still having to be met by the patient. Since Medicare has
a number of gaps in coverage, most of the enrolled buys own supplemental insurance coverage.
Medicaid is funded jointly by the federal and state authorities and is available for individuals of
all ages and families with low incomes and resources who cannot aﬀord proper medical care.
Champus (now known as Tricare) is a health care beneﬁts program for active duty and retired
members of the military.
ChampVa is a health care beneﬁts program for permanently disabled veterans and their depen-
dents.
7A possible explanation of the higher percentage of healthy individuals among insured can be
found in the insurance plan characteristics. Plans may have been designed to distort their oﬀering
to attract the healthy and repel the sick.
Seeking favorable risk is often referred as cream skimming. These strategic behavior can take a
variety of forms including designing insurance beneﬁts packages in such a way as to be more attrac-
tive to healthy persons than unhealthy by, for instance, excluding particular prescription drugs
or oﬀering health club memberships which appeal to the low risks. The result is that individuals
enrolled in health insurance are relatively healthy people.
93.1 Risk Proﬁle Variables
To perform the correlation test, ﬁrst we classify individuals as being high and low risk
proﬁle individuals. Individuals are classiﬁed as being low-risk if their health status
is good. As a measure of health status we use two indicators: a subjective and
an objective one. In particular, following Berger and Leigh(1988), we choose blood
pressure as an indicator of overall health, since it is the most important predictor
of cardiovascular disease which is the greatest killer in the U.S. We create a binary
variable (hypertension) that takes value one if respondents suﬀer from high blood
pressure and zero otherwise. We classify individuals as high-risk proﬁle individuals
if they report that they suﬀer from hypertension. Moreover, we use as a measure of
overall health SAH (self-assessed health)8,w h i c hi saﬁve category variable rating
from poor to excellent. We construct a binary variable (health) with the value one
if individuals report that their health status is excellent, very good, good and zero
otherwise (fair or poor). Then, we classify as high-risk individuals those whose
self-reported health is fair or poor.
In addition, individuals are classiﬁed as being characterized by a high-risk proﬁle
if they follow an unhealthy life-style. Life-style variables measure the eﬀort that
individuals use to prevent an illness and at the same time they are good predictor of
future illness. The behavioral variables employed are indicator of smoking, alcohol
consumption, physical activity practice and BMI9. Individuals are classiﬁed as being
characterized by a high risk proﬁle if they smoke, usually consume heavy drinks,
practice vigorous physical activity less than once per week and if their reported BMI
8Self- reported health status is a very good indicator of overall health. It has been showed to be
an important predictor of subsequent mortality and medical services use, and is widely used as a
measure for the stock of health in pervious studies that analyze empirical determinants of health.
( Contoyannis and Jones 2004, Contoyannis et al. 2004).
9BMI (Body Max Index) is used as measure of obesity. Obesity is considered a risk factor for
several diseases. It is often associated with aspects of an individual’s life-style such as an insuﬃcient
physical activity and inappropriate nutrition. Those who are a BMI > or equal than 25.0000 are
overweight and at risk of obesity and are expected to have poorer health.
10is higher than 25.0000.
3.2 Other Characteristics
In addition to the health and life-style indicators, the independent variables, used to
control for diﬀerences in policy, can be grouped in the following categories: demo-
graphic variables (age, sex, race), socioeconomic variables (education, marital status,
employment status, income) preferences (risk aversion). Moreover, we control for to-
tal annual expenditure, out-of-pocket annual premium and whether individuals suﬀer
from any form of disabilities that limit their activities (such as working, studying
etc.).
Because older individuals tend to use more medical services and may have higher
medical expenditure, we expect a positive relationship between age and the amount
of reimbursement. Since males tend to use less medical services than females we
expect a negative correlation between males and health insurance reimbursement. A
positive relationship between the variables black and other race and the completeness
of coverage is expected because of the higher need of medical services among non
whites caused by a higher morbidity rate.
According to the ”marriage protection hypothesis” (which states that the actual
process of living with a spouse confers health beneﬁts to both partners) we expect
that married people tend to use less medical services. Thus, we expect a negative
correlation between the variable ”married” and the dependent variable that measure
the generosity of health plan.
The variables which are indicators of education, employment status and income
are included in the analysis to account for diﬀerences, other than risk type, which
may aﬀect the amount of insurance purchase by the insured. We expect a negative
relationship between the degree of education and the amount of insurance purchased:
individuals with a higher level of schooling are observed to be healthier than the
11others10. Hence, we expect that individuals with a higher degree of education use
less medical services and purchase a less complete insurance plan. Similarly, the
coeﬃcients for income and employed are expected to be negative.
We include also a measure of risk aversion. Higher risk aversion translates into a
willingness to pay more to eliminate ﬁnancial risk. For a given premium, we expect a
positive coeﬃcient for the variable that measures risk aversion since more risk-averse
insured will be willing to tolerate higher deductible, coinsurance rate, stop-loss than
someone who is less risk-averse11.
The variable that we use as indicator of limited activity controls for the portion
of risk observable to the insurer. The activity limitations indicator is expected to
be positively related to the generosity of the health insurance plan, because being
limited increases the likelihood of need for medical care.
10One explanation of this empirical regularity is that education increases the productivity of
producing health i.e. more health can be produced for the same inputs (Gerdtham et al., 1999,
Berger and Leigh, 1989). Schooling helps people choose healthier life-styles by improving their
knowledge of the relationship between health behaviors and health outcomes. (Kenkel, 1991). A
more educated person may have more knowledge about the harmful eﬀects of cigarette smoking,
alcohol consumption or about what constitutes an appropriate, healthy diet. Furthermore, schooling
increases information about the importance of having regular exams or screening tests to prevent
an illness or at least to minimize disease.
11Chiappori and Salani` e in their recent work ”Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance
Markets” stressed the importance of including risk aversion among explanatory variables:
[... more risk averse drivers tend to both buy more insurance and to drive cautiously; this would
even suggest a negative correlation between insurance coverage and accident frequency...]. Then, if
do not control for individuals risk aversion, we may obtain spurious correlation between individuals’
risk proﬁle and completeness of coverage.
124 Estimation Strategies and Empirical Results
4.1 Wooldridge Two-Step Estimation
To test for diﬀerences in insurance purchases by high and low risk proﬁle individuals
we use as a measure of completeness of coverage the natural logarithm of health care
reimbursement (total health care expenditure paid by private insurance, Medicare
and Medicaid. The assumption of lognormality better ﬁts the expenditure reim-
bursement and has precedents (see, for example, Keeler et al., 1977, Browne and
Doerpinghaus, 1993).
Health insurance reimbursement is only deﬁned for a subset of individuals from
the overall population since we observe it only for those who participate in insurance
and face positive health care expenditure. Hence the model suﬀers from sample selec-
tion bias and straightforward regression analysis may lead to inconsistent parameters
estimate.
Another problem that arises from the estimation is the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity in the equations of interest. Wooldridge (1995) has proposed an es-
timator which deals with both sources of estimation bias; this estimator requires
panel data and produces consistent parameter estimates under a set of assumptions.
It does not impose distributional assumptions about the error terms but requires
specifying the functional form of the conditional mean of the individual eﬀects in
the structural equation. We extend this method to the case in which selectivity is
due to two sources rather than one.
We start by sketching Wooldridge’s (1995) sample selection model with one se-
lection criterion, then we present a speciﬁcation of the model in which the selection
process is based on two selection criteria rather than one.
13Following M.Rochina-Barrachina (1999), we consider the following problem:
d∗
it = zitγ + µi + uit
dit =0 if d∗
it ≤ 0




it = xitβ + αi + εit
yit = y∗
it if dit =1
yit not observed otherwise
(2)
where equation (1) deﬁnes the selection rule while equation (2) is the primary equa-
tion. i (i =1 ,...n) denotes the individuals while t (t =1 ,...,t) denotes the panel.
xit and zit are vector of exogenous variables. The dependent variable in the pri-
mary equation, yit, is observed only for the observations satisfying the selection rule.
Terms µi and αi are ﬁxed eﬀects12. Wooldridge suggests employing Chamberlain
(1980) characterization, by assuming the conditional mean of the individual eﬀects
in the selection equation as a linear projections on the leads and lags of observable
variables:
µi = zi1δ1 + ... + zitδt + ci (3)
where ci is a random component. By substituting Chamberlain characterization into
the selection equation yields:
d∗
it = zitγ + zi1δ1 + ... + zitδt + vit (4)
where vit = ci+uit. vit is distributed independently of zit and is normally distributed
with zero mean and σ2 variance. The regression function of αi on zit and vit is linear,
12The individual eﬀects are assumed to be the ﬁxed eﬀets rather than the random eﬀects.
14accordingly:
E [αi |zit,v it]=xi1ψ1 + ... + xitψt + φtvit (5)
We do not observe vit, but only the binary indicator dit. Then, we replace E [αi |zit,v it]
with:
E [αi |zit,d it =1]=xi1ψ1 + ... + xitψt + φtE [vit |zit,d it =1] ( 6 )
Wooldridge assumes that εit is mean independent of zit conditional on vit and its
conditional mean is linear on vit:
E [εit |zit,v it]=E [εit |vit]=ρtvit (7)
By the Law of Iterated Expectation:
E [εit |zit,d it =1]=ρtE [vit |zit,d it =1] ( 8 )
From the above assumption, Wooldridge derives an explicit expression for
E [αi + εit |zit,d it =1]=E [αi |zit,d it =1]+E [εit |zit,d it =1]=
= xi1ψ1 + ... + xitψt +( φt + ρt)E [vit |zit,d it =1]
(9)
where
E [vit |zit,d it =1]=λ(zi1γ1 + ... + zitγt) (10)
So, for each period, Wooldridge suggests to estimate a cross-sectional probit model
for participation and compute the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), then, estimate the
structural equation:
yit = xi1ψ1 + ... + xitψt + xitβ +( φt + ρt)λ(zi1γ1 + ... + zitγt) (11)
15by using ﬁxed eﬀe c tO L So rp o o l e dO L Sf o rt h es a m p l ef o rw h i c hdit = 1 (Vella,
1998).
Concerning the health insurance reimbursement model, we consider the following
characterization of Wooldridge’s sample selection model where selectivity bias is a
function of two indices:
d∗
it1 = zit1γ
1 + µi1 + uit1
dit1 =0 if d∗
it1 ≤ 0





2 + µi2 + uit2
dit2 =0 if d∗
it2 ≤ 0




it = xitβ + αi + εit
yit = y∗
it if dit =1
yit not observed otherwise
(14)
Let dit1 be an unobserved variable denoting insurance participation decision and dit2
an unobserved variable denoting health care expenditure participation decision. zit1
, zit2 and xit are vector of exogenous variables. yit denotes the natural logarithm
of health insurance reimbursement. yit is observed only for the sample for which
dit1 =1a n ddit2 = 1. Terms µi1, µi2 and αi are ﬁxed eﬀects.
Sample selection is now based on two criteria. The method of estimation relies
crucially on the relationship between vit1 and vit2
13, in particular, the estimation de-
pends on whether the two error terms are independent or correlated, that is whether
or not Cov(vit1,v it2) = 0. The simplest case is when the disturbances are uncor-
related (Maddala,1983, Vella, 1998). If Cov(vit1,v it2) = 0 we can easily extend
13From Chamberlain trasformation of the individual eﬀects: vit1 = ci1+uit1 and vit2 = ci2+uit2
16Wooldridge’s two-step estimation method to this model. The correction term to
include as regressor in the primary equation is:
E [εit |zit,d it1 =1 ,d it2 =1]=ρt1λ1
¡





zi12γ12 + ... + zit2γt2
¢ (15)
Then, we estimate the following model:















zi12γ12 + ... + zit2γt2
¢ (16)
T h ep r o c e d u r ec o n s i s t si nﬁrst estimating, for each period, by two single a cross-
sectional probit model, the selection equation one and the selection equation two.
Than, the two corresponding Inverse Mills Ratio can be imputed and included as
correction terms in the primary equation. Thus, by ﬁxed eﬀect or pooled OLS14,
estimate of the resulting primary equation corrected for selection bias can be done
for the sample for which dit1 =1a n ddit2 =1 .
In the case vit1 and vit2 are correlated, so that Cov(vit1,v it2)=σ2,[ ... the
expression get very messy...] (Maddala, 1983) and we have to use for each period




¯ ¯zit1,z it2dit1 =1 ,d it2 =1
¤
= ρt1M12 + ρt2M21 (17)
where Mij =( 1− σ12)










14In this analysis ﬁxed eﬀect however presents a signiﬁcant limitation with the respect to pooled
O L S:w ec a nn o ta s s e s st h ee ﬀect of variables that do not vary very much within group: i.e. degree
of education, race, region, etc. that can impact signiﬁcantly the health insurance reimbursement.
Also, explanatory variables whose change across time is constant — e.g. age — can not be included.
174.1.1 Bivariate Probit Model for Care Expenditure and Insurance
To test whether vit1 and vit2 are correlated we run for each year a “preliminary”
bivariate probit between insurance and health care expenditure participation. In our
model the dependent variable employed to predict the probability of facing positive
health care expenditure is a binary variable that takes value one if individuals incur
in positive health care expenditure during the year of interview, and zero otherwise.
The independent variables employed can been categorized into three dimensions:
need for care (need to see a specialist or have treatments or tests and an indicator of
health status16), predisposition to use health services (age, sex, marital status, race)
and enabling factors (education, insurance, income, employment status, region and
residential location17). Among enabling factor, we consider insurance participation.
An insured individual, in fact, may consume more medical services and have a greater
expenditure compared to an uninsured one (i.e.moral hazard eﬀect). (Arrow, 1963;
Pauly, 1968; Dowd et al.,1991). In this study, the situation is further complicated by
the fact that insurance participation itself may be aﬀected by the likelihood of having
positive health expenditure. The choice of insurance coverage may be aﬀected by
planned medical expenditure and expectations about medical care utilization (i.e.
adverse selection eﬀect).
To test the potential endogeneity of health insurance and at the same time
whether the covariance between health insurance choice and health expenditure par-
ticipation is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent of zero, we run for each year a cross sectional
15There is only one cross-sectional example in the literature that is due to Fishe et. al.(1981).
They estimated the selection equations by bivariate probit method and evaluated the above expres-
sion by numerical methods.
16We adopt as indicator of health status the objective measure of health that is ”hypertension”
since it seems to work better.
17The variables MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) and the indicators of regions control for
medical cost diﬀerences between metropolitan and no-metropolitan statistical area, as well as by
region of the country.
18recursive bivariate probit models (Maddala, 1999).
For each period, the recursive structure builds on a ﬁrst reduced form equation for
the potentially endogenous dummy measuring insurance participation and a second
structural form equation determining the expenditure participation:
d∗
it1 = zi11γ11 + ... + zit1γt1 + vit1 (18)
d∗
it2 = zi12γ12 + ... + zit2γt2 + vit2 =




it2 are latent variables, and dit1 and dit2 are dichotomous variables




ditj =0 if d∗
itj ≤ 0
ditj =1 if d∗
itj > 0
; j =1 ,2 (20)
zit1, the lags of zitj and wit are vector of exogenous variables, γ and ξ are param-
eter vectors, ζ is a scalar parameter. The dependent variable dit1 used to predict
the probability of being insured is again a dummy variable that takes value one if
respondents are insured and zero otherwise. The vector of explanatory variables zit1
used to predict the probability of being insured includes both exogenous variables
that are determinants of health expenditure and personal attributes that are only
determinative of health insurance choice18 ( i.e. risk aversion). We assume that,
for each period, the error terms vit1 and vit2 are distributed as bivariate normal,
18Estimation of a recursive bivariate probit model requires some considerations for the identi-
ﬁcation of the model parameters: at least one of the insurance equation exogenous variables has
not to be included in the expenditure equation as explanatory variable (Maddala, 1983). Following
Maddala’s approach we include among explanatory variables in the insurance equation a measure
of risk aversion assuming that risk aversion has direct eﬀect on insurance choice while it has only an
indirect eﬀect on health care expenditure through insurance participation. In addition we exclude
from insurance participation equation ”need for care” variable to avoid causality problems with the
dependent variable.
19with zero mean and variance covariance matrix Σ. Σ has values of 1 on the leading




















In the above setting, the exogeneity condition is stated in terms of the correlation
coeﬃcient, which can be interpreted as the correlation between the unobservable
explanatory variables of the two diﬀerent equations. The two selection equations
can be estimated separately as single probit models only in the case of independent
error terms vit1 and vit2 i.e. the coeﬃcient ρjk is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent of zero
(k =1 ,2). If the error terms vit1 and vit2 are independent we can deal with the
above model as independent equations (Maddala, 1983) and apply the model in the
equation (16)19.
Table 3 shows the correlation coeﬃcients and the p-value for each year sample:




= 0 is not rejected; hence, we can deal with
the model in the equation (16) and compute Inverse Mills Ratio by using the two
selection equations as single probit models.
Tables 4 and 5 show coeﬃcients for insurance choice and expenditure partici-
pation equation estimated using bivariate probit speciﬁcation. Our ﬁndings do not
support adverse selection in insurance choice: no unobservable that aﬀect the health
care expenditure signiﬁcantly aﬀect insurance participation, while being insured has
a positive inﬂuence on the probability of facing positive health care expenditure 20.I t
19The estimation of the model is carried out using STATA 9 software by which it is possible to




the hypothesis H : ρ = 0. If the error terms are independent the bivariate probit estimation is
equivalent to the separate probit estimations.
20We have tested for multicollinearity in both probit models (health care expenditure and in-
surance model) by using the Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance(1/VIF)(Wooldridge,
2000). We ﬁnd that VIF for all the independent variables in both the equations are quite low.
Therefore, we can safely assume that there are no problems of multicollinerity.
20is worth noting that while socioeconomic variables inﬂuence the probability of being
insured they do not impact signiﬁcantly the probability of positive expenditure.
4.2 Structural Equation Estimation
Tables 6, 7 and 8 show the coeﬃcients for the structural insurance reimbursement
equation estimated using pooled OLS speciﬁcation. The test for completeness of
insurance coverage purchased by high risk proﬁle individuals includes three pooled
O L Sm o d e l se a c ho fw h i c hc o n t a i n sad i ﬀerent measure of risk: a subjective measure
of health (self-assessed health), an objective measure of health (hypertension) and
independent variables that measure the individual life-style21. I ne a c hm o d e lt h e
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of health insurance reimbursement.
We ﬁnd a little evidence for adverse selection: table 6 shows that the coeﬃ-
cient estimate for the variable ”health” is negative but is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Life-style variables do not inﬂuence the choice of health plan with exception of the
variable ”exercise” that, however, presents a positive coeﬃcient. Table 7 shows
that the variable that measures whether individuals suﬀer from high blood pressure
is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the health insurance reimbursement.
The reason of this positive correlation may be found in the fact that more than half
of all hypertensive in our sample are covered by Medicaid or Medicare. Medicare
and Medicaid are essentially universal health insurance programs for this segment
of the population. However, these programs present a number of gaps in coverage:
for instance, despite Medicare and Medicaid have a prescription drug beneﬁt, often
people face restrictions in the number of covered medications. Since these restric-
tions, many people will exceed the initial drug beneﬁt cap and may remain at risk
for inadequate blood pressure control. (Duru et al., 2007). Hence, many hyper-
21We have constructed three diﬀerent sub-models since the three measures of risk are strongly
correlated and may generate problems of multicollinearity.
21tensives are forced to buy their own supplemental insurance coverage which oﬀers
hypertensive prescription drugs; normally, those plans are more comprehensive than
Medicare and Medicaid.
As expected the variable that measures whether respondents suﬀer from dis-
abilities which limit their activiti e sp r e s e n t sap o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant coeﬃcients.
The variable that measures individual risk aversion presents a positive sign but the
coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Concerning the variables that measure total income, education and employment
status, the parameter estimates have the expected sign, but only the parameter for
education is statistically signiﬁcant. In the empirical literature we can observe that
higher educational degree is often associated to a better health status; in particular
it seems that education improves indirectly health status by helping people choose
healthier life-styles and by improving their knowledge of the relationship between
health behaviors and health outcomes (Kenkel, 1991). Then, people with more
schooling tend to choose less complete insurance plans since they tend to enjoy good
health.
Other than regular variables, two independent variables here are the IMR (In-
verse Mills Ratio) which have been estimated from the ﬁrst and second probit selec-
tion equations. When added to the outcome equation as additional regressors, they
measure the sample selection eﬀect due to lack of observations on the non-health in-
surance purchasers and non-health expenditure participants. These variables should
be statistically signiﬁcant to justify the use of Wooldridge two-step estimation. Since
in our models they are statistically signiﬁcant there may be sample selection problem
in the data and we need to use Wooldridge method (Bath and Jain, 2006).
225 Summary and Conclusions
We have used the 2003/2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey in conjunctions with
the 2002 National Health Interview Survey to asses whether US health insurance
market is aﬀected by adverse selection. We have conducted a positive correlation
test which estimates the correlation between the amount of insurance an individual
buys and his ex-post risk experience. We have employed three measures of risk: per-
ceived health status, blood pressure and individuals’ life-style. In addition, we have
controlled for a number of enrollee characteristics including age, sex, race, education
and family size which are used in pricing insurance policies. As indicator of gen-
erosity and completeness of health plan, we have employed health care expenditure
reimbursement which measures the diﬀerence between total health care expenditure
and out-of-pocket expenditure on health care paid by consumers. Since health insur-
ance reimbursement is only deﬁned for those who participate in insurance and have
positive health care expenditure the model is estimated using Wooldridge’s (1995)
two step estimation procedure. We have extended this method to the case in which
selectivity is due to two sources rather than one.
The evidence for adverse selection seems to be lacking. Our ﬁndings do not
support the existence of a systematic relation between illness of individuals and
insurance choice. There is no separating equilibrium: high risk individuals do not
purchase more complete insurance than low risk proﬁle individuals.
The absence of correlation between individuals’ risk-proﬁle and completeness
of health insurance can be explained by the fact that individuals may choose a
health insurance plan based not only on their expected health status but also on
their preferences such as the geographic location, whether they can continue to
see doctors with whom they have already established relationships, whether friends
recommended plans etc. If such preferences exert suﬃcient inﬂuence, risk-based
23selection is a minor consideration; as they become less important, adverse selection
increases.
Arguably, another explanation for these results may be found in health plans risk
selection practise. The distribution of health expenditure is highly skewed: only a
small fraction of individuals account for most of health care spending. Because of
this, insurers may have a strong incentives to distort their oﬀe r i n gt oa v o i de n r o l l m e n t
of high cost individuals. Then, insurers may practice a kind of ”reverse adverse
selection”: they would try to increase their proﬁts by refusing to sign contracts with
the worst risks in an insurance pool (see Siegelman, 2004 ). These strategic behavior
can take a variety of forms including: designing insurance beneﬁts packages in such
a way as to be more attractive to healthy people than unhealthy ones for instance
by excluding particular prescription drugs, oﬀering numerous pediatrician ( families
with children are better risks) or by excluding cancer specialist visits. If health plans
cream healthy individuals, those who are enrolled in health insurance are relatively
healthy people and the correlation between risk- proﬁle and the generosity of health
insurance plans becomes insigniﬁcant.
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Table 1: Variables Name and Deﬁnition
 Variables Name Variables Definition
age age in years
male  1 if male, 0 otherwise
white 1 if white, 0 otherwise
black  1 if black, 0 otherwise
other_race 1 if other race, 0 otherwise
northeast 1 if lives in Northeast region, 0 otherwise
midweast 1 if lives in Midweast region, 0 otherwise
west 1 if lives in  West region, 0 otherwise
south 1 if lives in  South region, 0 otherwise
msa 1 if lives in Metropolitan Statistical Area, 0 otherwise
income total annual income
employed 1 if employed, 0 otherwise
education 1 if had high_school, master or PhD degree 
when entered in MEPS, 0 otherwise
expenditure total annual health care expenditure
reimbursement total annual health care expenditure paid by insurance
family size family size
married 1 if married, 0 otherwise
health 1 if current health is excellent, very good, good, 0 otherwise
activity limitations 1 if has limited in any activities because health
 problems, 0 otherwise
hypertention 1 if suffers from high blood pressure, 0 otherwise
smoke 1 if is current smoker, 0 otherwise
alcohol 1 ifcorrent consumes heavy alcohol, 0 otherwise
execise 1 if participates in vigorous physical activity 
at least once at week, 0 otherwise
obese body max index >= 25.0000
need care 1 if needs for care during the year of interview, 0 otherwise
insured 1 if insured, 0 otherwise
risk aversion 1 if is not likely to take risk, 0 otherwise
mills1 mills ratio insurance partecipation
mills2 mills ratiohealth care expenditure partecipation
30Table 2: Summary Statistics
  All Insured Uninsured
Age 48.18   48.58 43,30
Male 0.317   0.316  0.331    
Income  38,062.86    39,924.13      15,563.32    
Total health care expenditure 4,120.202 4,295.44 2,001.882
Annual premium   1,736.688    
Northeast 0.168 0.177 0.066     
South 0.351   0.341 0.471  
West 0.203 0.196 0.279   
Midwest 0.278 0.285 0.184 
White 0.859 0.869 0.728 
Black 0.092 0.085 0.184
Other Race 0.049 0.046      0.088
Metropolitan statistical area 0.806  0.818 0.669
Health status 0.892 0.897    0.824  
Hypertension 0.262   0.265 0.221 
Activity limitations 0.318 0.314  0.360
Smoke 0.167    0.159  0.272    
Alcohol 0.056    0.047 0.169
Bmi 27.44 26.96 33.18
Exercise 0.479 0.493     0.309
Risk aversion 0.788 0.799    0.662  
Number of observations 1780 1644 136
31Table 3: Bivariate Probit Correlation Coeﬃcients
                 Dependent Variables        pho  p-value
Positive Expenditure/ Be Insured 2003 -0.5299      0.260       
Positive Expenditure/ Be Insured 2004  -0.9496         0.541       
Table 4: Cross-Sectional Bivariate Probit Estimation Coeﬃcients
(p-value in parentheses)
   Expenditure 2003 Be Insured 2003
intercept 0.9643   (0.282)
age 0.0168   (0.183) 0.0151  (0.014 )
male -0.9162  (0.000) -0.1509 ( 0.357)    
black -0.2153  (0.503) -0.5149 (0.018)
other_race -0.1419  (0.769) -0.3913 (0.190)
family size -0.2158  (0.011) 0.0514  (0.447 ) 
msa -0.1917  (0.529 ) 0.4337  (0.010)
northeast 0.2356   (0.482 )  0.4700 (0.097 )
midwest 0.7171  ( 0.066) 0.0817 (0.676 )
west 1.0350  ( 0.025)       -0.3043 (0.123)
insured 2.0831  ( 0.010)
income 2.48e-06(0.608)   0.0000  (0.000)
employed -0.9426 (0.073)   0.2692 (0.169) 
education -0.1600 ( 0.685) 0.7078  (0.000)
married 0.0911   (0.749)  0.4618  (0.007)
need care 0.1413   (0.361) 
hypertension -0.0309  (0.922 ) 0.1954  (0.312)
activity limit. -0.0227  ( 0.945) 0.0006 (0.997)
risk aversion 0.2727  (0.125)
Note: sample size 890; statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
32Table 5: Cross-Sectional Bivariate Probit Estimation Coeﬃcients
(p-value in parentheses)
   Expenditure 2004 Be Insured 2004
intercept 1.5073 (0.090)  
age 0.0040  (0.716) 0.0177 (0.003)
male -1.064  (0.000) -0.0717 (0.655)
black -0.4799 (0.235) -0.4255 (0.068)
other_race -0.0838 (0.868) -0.3941 (0.176)
family size -0.2521 (0.005) 0.0495 (0.530)
msa -0.4831 (0.126) 0.3653 (0.027)
northeast -0.1615 (0.706) 0.4407 (0.094)
midwest  -0.3098 (0.702) 0.2263 (0.247)
west -0.3386 (0.288) -0.2170 (0.260)
insured 2.0491 (0.005)
income 8.62e-06 (0.045) 0.0000 (0.000)
employed -0.6465 (0.100) 0.0262 (0.892)
education -0.1996 (0.690) 0.5928 (0.002)
married 0.1268 (0.693) 0.3238 (0.074)
need care 0.2761 (0.059)
hypertension 0.6086 (0.150) 0.0780 (0.683)
activity limit. 0.2282 (0.516)  0.0733 (0.665)
risk aversion 0.2129 (0.208)
Note: sample size 890; statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
33Table 6: Pooled OLS Regression Results.
Risk Variable: Self-Assessed Health.
 Preidictor Variables Coefficients  p-values











activity limitations 0.2518 0.001
health -0.1613 0.162
risk aversion 0.1370 0.113
mills1 -2.2891 0.000
mills2 -1.1936 0.001
N o t e :s a m p l es i z e1 6 1 3 ;R 2 = 0.4239; Adjusted R2 = 0.4185;
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
34Table 7: Pooled OLS Regression Results.
Risk Variable: Hypertension
 Preidictor Variables Coefficients  p-values











activity limitations 0.2405 0.001
hypertension 0.2514 0.002
risk aversion 0.1379 0.109
mills1 -2.1702 0.000
mills2 -1.0837 0.004
N o t e :s a m p l es i z e1 6 1 3 ;R 2 =0.4265; Adjusted R2 = 0.4212;
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
35Table 8: Pooled OLS Regression Results.
Risk Variable: Life-Style Indicators
 Preidictor Variables Coefficients  p-values
















risk aversion 0.1458 0.091
mills1 -2.3287 0.000
mills2 -1.1903 0.001
N o t e :s a m p l es i z e1 6 1 3 ;R 2 = 0.4277; Adjusted R2 = 0.4212;




Recent working papers 
 
The complete list of working papers is can be found at http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl 
 
*Economics Series    **Political Theory Series   
ε Al.Ex Series 
 
 
2008 n.116*  Carla  Marchese:  The limits to growth then and now 
2008 n.115**  Guido  Ortona:  Perché in Italia le elezioni violano la legge di Duverger? 
2008  n.114*  Cinzia Di Novi: From theory to implementation of the best policy instrument to 
protect human health: a brief overview 
 
2008  n.113*  Cinzia Di Novi: Adverse selection in the U.S. health insurance markets: 
evidence from the MEPS 
 




ε  Stefania Ottone and Ferruccio Ponzano: How people perceive the welfare state. 
A real effort experiment 
 
2008  n.110*  Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni: A theory of military 
dictatorships 
 
2008 n.109*  Marcello  Montefiori and Marina Resta: Social influence and neighbourhood 
effects in the health care market 
 
2007  n.108*  Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni: War and endogenous democracy 
2007 n.107*  Fabio  Privileggi:  The cutoff policy of taxation when CRRA taxpayers differ in 
risk aversion coefficients and income: a proof 
 
2007 n.106*  Daniele  Bondonio:  La valuazione d’impatto della riforma universitaria 3+2: 
un’analisi empirica sui dati dell’Ufficio Statistica del MIUR 
 
2007  n.105*  Franco Amisano and Alberto Cassone: Proprietà intellettuale ed industria 
farmaceutica: ricerche nel campo della proprietà intellettuale dei farmaci 
 
2007 n.104*  Gianna  Lotito:  Resolute Choice in interaction: a qualitative experiment 
2007 n.103*  Daniele  Bondonio:  La distribuzione dei finanziamenti europei sul territorio 
regionale: un’analisi su micro-dati 2000-2006 
 
2007  n.102*  Stefania Ottone and Ferruccio Ponzano: Non-self-centered inequity aversion 
matters. A model 
  
2007 n.101*  Daniele  Bondonio:  Gli effetti occupazionali delle politiche di aiuto alle imprese 
una valutazione comparativa tra diverse modalità di agevolazione 
 
2007  n.100*  Giovanni B. Ramello: Access to vs. exclusion from knowledge: Intellectual 
property, efficiency and social justice 
 
2007 n.99*  Roberto  Zanola:  Major influences on circus attendance 
2007 n.98**  Corrado  Malandrino:  Pre-modern covenant and covenantalism in Daniel Judah 
Elazar's federalist elaboration 
 
2007  n.97
ε  Stefania Ottone, Ferruccio Ponzano and Roberto Ricciuti: Simulating voting rule 
reforms for the Italian parliament. An economic perspective 
 
2007  n.96*  Albert Breton, Anthony Scott and Angela Fraschini: Explaining differences in 
environmental governance patterns between Canada, Italy and the United States 
 
2007 n.95*  Roberto  Ricciuti:  The quest for a fiscal rule: Italy, 1861-1998 
2007  n.94
ε  Davide Biassoni: L'influenza dei sistemi elettorali nella stabilita' dei governi 
2007  n.93**  Joerg Luther and Domenico Francavilla: Nepal's constitutional transition 
 
2007  n.91
ε  Marie-Edith Bissey and Guido Ortona: The program for the simulation of 
electoral systems ALEX4.1: what it does and how to use it 
 
2007 n.90*  Roberto  Ricciuti:  Un'analisi economica della partecipazione ai referendum 
abrogativi 
 
2007  n.89*  Michela Bia and Alessandra Mattei: Application of the Generalized Propensity 
Score. Evaluation of public contributions to Piedmont entreprises 
 
2007 n.88*  Michela  Bia:  The Propensity Score method in public policy evaluation: a survey 
2007  n.87*  Luca Mo Costabella and Alberto Martini: Valutare gli effetti indesiderati 
dell’istituto della mobilità sul comportamento delle imprese e dei lavoratori. 
 
2007  n.86
ε  Stefania Ottone: Are people samaritans or avengers? 
2007 n.85*  Roberto  Zanola:  The dynamics of art prices: the selection corrected repeat-sales 
index 
 
2006  n.84*  Antonio Nicita and Giovanni B. Ramello: Property, liability and market power: 
the antitrust side of copyright 
 
 